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Windsor: Operations of 1 Canadian Infantry Divisional Artillery

Operations of 1 Canadian
Infantry Divisional Artillery
24 August - 22 September 1944
January 1944 1st Canadian Infantry Division
reverted to command of I Canadian Corps after
seven months of campaigning in Sicily and Italy
under a British Corps. The story of the division's
resentment toward the level of paperwork foisted
on them by H.D.G. Crerar's untried corps
headquarters is legendary. Modern military
historians assume this rancour is indicative of a
1914-18 mindset among Second World War
Canadian senior officers which prevented themfrom
adapting to the fast-paced nature of modern
mechanized warfare in the 1940s.1 Ironically, much
of that "paper-pushing " appears to have contributed
to the Canadian Army's victories over German forces
in the great battles of 1944-45.
Among the most labourious administrative
chores were the operational narratives and lessons
learned reports requiring battle participants to
analyze recent actions and draw conclusions for
improving combat efficiency. These reports do
indeed date back to the Great War. Most First World
War historians agree that such documents were a
key ingredient to the remarkable success of the
Canadian Corps in 1915-1918.2
The following report was prepared by the 1st
Canadian Divisional Artillery staff in late September
1944, during the brief pause between the
breakthrough of the Gothic and Rimini Lines and
the subsequent pursuit into the Po Valley. In the
weeks prior to that pause, I Canadian Corps suffered

their heaviest losses to date against the most
determined German resistance encountered during
the Italian Campaign. They also demonstrated
remarkable military skill and professionalism, and
won their greatest victories of the entire war.
Readers may note that the report is tightly
focussed on exacting every possible ounce of combat
power out of an already effective organization.
Continual refinements to the Anglo-Canadian
system were essential given that Alliedforces in Italy
usually possessed the barest minimum of resources
necessary to accomplish their strategic mission of
preventing German formations from withdrawing
to more decisive fronts. Similar reports are found
in the war diaries of all units and formations in the
Canadian Army in the Second World War. What is
most significant about this process is the rapidity
with which recommended improvements were put
into practice during subsequent operations.
Lee Windsor

Notes
1. J.L Granatstein, The Generals: The Canadian Army's
Senior Commanders in the Second World War
(Toronto: 1993), pp. 107-108.
2. Shane Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire:
The Canadian Corps in the last 100 days of the Great
War (Westport: 1997).
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Operations of 1 Canadian Infantry Divisional Artillery
24 August - 22 September 1944
Commander, Royal Artillery 1st C a n a d i a n Infantry Division

Introduction
1. During the period 24 A u g u s t - 22 S e p e m b e r
1944, 1 Cdn Inf Div completed the operation to
capture RIMINI a n d t h u s assisted in securing
an entry into the PLAINS of LOMBARDY.
2. At the o u t s e t this operation, d u e to various
conditions of terrain a n d anticipated e n e m y

strategy, w a s divided into four p h a s e s , which in
effect, were to form one c o n t i n u o u s operation:
Phase I - To a s s a u l t across R METAURO a n d
establish bridgeheads a n d crossings.
P h a s e II - To a d v a n c e from R METAURO to
R FOGLIA.
P h a s e III - To b r e a k t h r o u g h the GOTHIC
LINE.
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PHASE IV - To advance and capture RIMINI.
Later, as events show, the operation included a
Phase V.
3. The role of Artillery, 1 Cdn Inf Div was to
supply direct support to the division for the
operation, and to assist in the support of
operations by flanking formations.

Phase I
The Assault Across R METAURO and
the Establishment of Bridgeheads
and Crossings
4. By 24 August 1944, 1 Cdn Inf Div was grouped
behind a cavalry force of the Polish Corps,
p r e p a r e d to c o n d u c t t h e o p e r a t i o n of
e s t a b l i s h i n g a b r i d g e h e a d a c r o s s the R
METAURO. This was to be done in two stages
with two brigades each with two battalions up,
with 1 Canadian Infantry Brigade (1 Cdn Inf Bde)
right, 2 Cdn Inf Bde left, 3 Cdn Inf Bde in reserve
and 21 Army Tank Bde Royal Armoured Corps
(RAC) in support. The first stage was to be a
silent infantry attack across the R METAURO to
the VIA FLAMINIA, an ideal start line for the
second stage. This was to be a co-ordinated two
brigade attack to the bridgehead objective
approximately 3000 yards beyond the highway,
and was to be supported by an intense artillery
program.
5. An appreciation for the artillery plan indicated
the following:
(a) the ground occupied by the enemy was
very rugged.
(b) the terrain on the enemy held side was
in four distinct ridges, thus lending itself to
four separate and distinct lines of attack.
(c) there was an abundance of information
on known enemy positions and localities.
Therefore it was considered that a series of
concentrations and linear targets would most
s u i t a b l y deal with the s i t u a t i o n . These
concentrations were in belts 400 to 500 yards
in depth, and timed to agree with the proposed
rate of advance of the infantry. A belt of prearranged defensive fire (DF) tasks was drawn
up to coincide with the outside perimeter of the

bridgehead. Flanking neutralization was coo r d i n a t e d with the flanking d i v i s i o n s .
Concentrated counter mortar and counter
battery programs were also incorporated into
the fire plan. All details were complete and the
plan was issued at 1200 hours 25 August 1944
for H-hour at 2359 hours, t h u s affording
sufficient time for detailed study by infantry and
formation commanders.
6. During the night 23/24 August 1944 regiments
of the divisional artillery, including 24 Army
Field Regiment (Self Propelled) (24 A Fd Regt
(SP)) RA u n d e r c o m m a n d , moved into
camouflaged positions to support the attack. One
troop of 2 Canadian Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment
(2 Cdn LAA Regt) was deployed with each field
regiment. Batteries from 1 Canadian Anti-Tank
Regiment (1 Cdn A Tk Regt) were with their
affiliated brigades. 15 and 111 Cdn A Tk Btys
were under command to support the armour.
7. The silent crossing of the R METAURO was
completely successful. At 2359 hours 25 August
1944 the artillery program commenced with all
the artillery resources of 1 Cdn Inf Div. 5 Cdn
Armd Div, 4 Brit Inf Div and some Polish Artillery
participating. Control of this fire plan was
comparatively easy and was maintained at HQ
RCA. The attack moved forward as scheduled.
8. By 0615 hours 26 August 1944 the two
brigades were secure in their bridgehead.
Crossings had been prepared and the armour
and supporting arms were moving forward. It
was later discovered that the enemy had
commenced withdrawing just prior to H-hour.
As a result the artillery fire came down on his
forces in the open, and inflicted terrible
casualties.

Phase II
The Advance from R METAURO
to R FOGLIA
9. The task of the division now was to advance
with all speed to the R FOGLIA, feel out the
defences of the GOTHIC LINE and, if possible,
break through before the enemy's prepared
defences could be completely manned. The two
leading brigades were ordered out of the
bridgehead at 0730 hrs 26 August 1944, 3 Cdn
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Inf Bde still being held in reserve.
This was carried out by 1 Cdn
Inf Bde on the right, and 2 Cdn
Inf Bde on the left. Both advances
were supported by armour from
21 Army Tank Bde RAC.
10. The terrain over which this
phase was to be conducted, was
rolling and barren, and afforded
very little cover. Poor secondary
narrow road and n u m e r o u s
enemy demolitions c r e a t e d
considerable delay in forward
movement of t r a n s p o r t and
supporting arms. Tanks
however, were able to move easily
and freely. A few prominent
features did, however, lend
themselves to defence by the
enemy, but the same features,
when in our hands, afforded
excellent observation points.
11. The role of the artillery in this
p h a s e could not be clearly
defined by any set piece fire plan,
a n d control of fire was
decentralized to some extent, in
order that continuous and rapid
s u p p o r t might always be
available as and when required.
12. Fire plans were numerous,
spontaneous and simple. Those
requiring a heavier weight of fire
t h a n could b e a d e q u a t e l y
handled by one regiment, or
requiring the weight of Army
Group Royal Artillery (AGRA)
were referred to me. At times fire
plans requiring the weight of the whole divisional
artillery or more, were drawn up and controlled
from my vehicle parked by the side of the road.
Speed was the essential factor throughout.
13. Movement of g u n s r e q u i r e d close
consideration. Gun areas were generally chosen
from a study of aerial photographs. Immediately
an area was declared safe for recce by my
forward reps at brigades, recce parties were
dispatched. Moves were arranged through
division. Generally regiments were moved
complete and were located in their new positions

in a matter of from two to five hours. On 26
August 1944 I moved all four regiments under
my command acrosss the R METAURO. On the
27 August 1944 I moved two, on the 28 August
1944 the other two, and on the following day all
four were again moved to a final position for the
assault on the GOTHIC LINE. Regiments at all
times were kept as far forward as the speed of
the infantry advance would permit.
14. Continuous close support was at all times
maintained. When a regiment engaged in the
close support of an attacking brigade was
73
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Medium Gun Position by Lawren P. Harris

ordered to move, it became necessary that some
other regiment take over its commitment. This
was done by a regiment not committed, putting
wireless sets on the frequencies of that which
was ordered to move. At all times the forward
observation officers and the infantry could call
for fire as required.
15. When not engaged in actual support of the
advance, harassing fire was emphasized, more
particularly when we came within range of the
R FOGLIA. On the night 28 August 1944,
intelligence r e p o r t e d t h e enemy to be
withdrawing his guns and equipment across the
river. A very heavy harassing fire (HF) program
covering all river crossings as well as adjacent
roads and paths of exit from the GOTHIC LINE,
was drawn up. The fire continued throughout
the night. The following day an intense HF
program on known enemy localities and likely
supply and maintenance routes was started, to
reach its climax just before H-hour for the attack
on the GOTHIC LINE.
16. Artillery liaison for this phase remained as
it had been originally at the commencement, and
as it would continue throughout this operation:

(a) An exchange of liaison officers between
Artillery 1 Cdn Inf Div, Artillery 1 Cdn Corps,
1 Cdn AGRA and the Artillery HQs of the
flanking divisions.
(b) Within o u r own formation; one
Commander Royal Artillery's (CRA's) rep and
three CO's reps with each brigade; one
Forward Observation Officer (FOO) with each
battalion; plus one CO's rep from 1 Cdn
AGRA with each brigade HQ. This allotment
was augmented as necessary, from time to
time but only for short periods.
Close liaison such as this completely facilitated
either decentralized or centralized control.
17. This phase of the operation was completed
according to plan. 2 Cdn Inf Bde was successful
in gaining the high ground overlooking R FOGLIA
and was relieved on the night of 28/29 August
1944 by 11 Cdn Inf Bde. On the right 1 Cdn Inf
Bde was consolidated approximately 3000 yards
this side of the river. The 48th Highlanders of
Canada later gained the high ground overlooking
the river. The relief of 1 Cdn Inf Bde by 3 Cdn
Inf Bde was completed by the morning 30 August
1944. Throughout this entire phase the advance
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of the artillery had conformed with the advance
of the infantry and s u p p o r t was always
maintained.

22. On the right 3 Cdn Inf Bde was now
conforming with this advance, while still farther
over the Polish Corps too, were moving through
the GOTHIC LINE. The GOTHIC LINE defences

Phase III
The Break-through the GOTHIC LINE
and the Pursuit to the R CONCA

had been breached.

18. 1 Cdn Inf Div was now faced up to the
GOTHIC LINE with two brigades up, on the right
3 Cdn Inf Bde, on the left 2 Cdn Inf Bde, in
reserve 1 Cdn Inf Bde, with 21 Army Tank Bde
in support. The task of the division now was to
assault and effect a break-through of the
GOTHIC LINE; to form a bridgehead across the
R FOGLIA and then advance as rapidly as
possible to the R CONCA. This effort coincided
directly with the task of 5 Cdn Armd Div who
had taken over the left sector of the divisional
front as in Phase II. Intermediate objectives were,
for 1 Cdn Inf Div MONTE LURO (0180), for 5
Cdn Armd Div TOMBA di PESARO (9979).
19. The rolling barren terrain continued with
the feature MONTE LURO completely
commanding the entire sector, both back to the
R FOGLIA and forward to the R CONCA. Roads,
although of a secondary nature, improved as the
ADRIATIC was approached. Once reached,
Highway 16, a first class road, would afford an
all weather supply route through CATTOLICA
(9886), PESARO (1280) and FANO (2173).
20. On the night 29/30 Augus 1944, while the
relief of 1 Cdn Inf Bde was being completed, 3
Cdn Inf Bde sent out patrols to recce both sides
of R FOGLIA for crossings, approaches and exits.
The following day the West Nova Scotia Regiment
was ordered across the river. After some
difficulty with mines and machine guns they did
establish themselves over the river, followed on
31 August 1944 by the Royal 22e Regiment. 3
Cdn Inf Bde was thus successful in securing the
lateral road across the R FOGLIA by morning 1
September 1944.
21.2 Cdn Inf Bde was progressing more rapidly
on the left, and by the night 31 August 1944 was
approaching POZZO ALTO (026778). This point
was taken the following morning and the advance
continued towards MONTE LURO (0117808).
This feature fell to the Loyal Edmonton Regiment
on 2 September 1944.

23. The Royal Canadian Dragoons at this point
under command 21 Tank Bde were exploiting
towards the ADRIATIC on the divisional axis.
During the late afternoon 2 September 1944 they
reached the sea at a point near the mouth of the
R CONCA. On the night 2 / 3 September 1944
consolidation of gains was carried out and by
early morning 3 September 1944 1 Cdn Inf Div
was firmly faced up to the R CONCA.
24. Since the beginning of Phase II of this
operation, intensive artillery research and
planning had been going on in anticipation of a
formal set piece attack on the GOTHIC LINE.
Accurate information on enemy localities and
movement was gathered daily from, air photo
interpretation, defence overprints, reports from
partisans and prisoners of war. This was all
collated and transcribed on a large mosaic air
photo at my headquarters. From this was
deduced an intense counter preparation and
harassing fire program which was started on the
morning of 30 August 1944 and which continued
until cancellation, due to the proximity of our
own troops. The targets for the fire plan to
support the anticipated large scale co-ordinated
attack consisted of various series of linear and
pinpoint concentrations and were selected from
this information. The intended fire plan however
did not progress beyond this point. However
these selected targets were of great value to both
myself and my reps in affording an abundance
of positive targets for close s u p p o r t and
impromptu fire plans.
25. As a result of the unexpected break-through,
the artillery supplied close support rather than
p r e d i c t e d set piece fire p l a n s u p p o r t .
Opportunity shoots were frequent. These shoots
varied in size from troop targets to a "V" target
on GABICCE (0186) during the afternoon of 2
S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 4 . We d e s i g n e d a very
concentrated impromptu fire plan in support of
the Loyal Edmonton Regiment's attack on
MONTE LURO (017808). This was a series of
heavy concentration on a time program by field,
medium and heavy guns. The program was fired
and remained on call as long as it was required.
75
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26. Much movement and speed of movement was
again essential in supplying continuous support.
Two field regiments were moved forward three
times, one field regiment twice, the SP regiment
twice, and one medium regiment was deployed,
all within the short period of the advance.
Continuous support was maintained at all times.
27. Harassing fire varied from the violent type
of the counter preparation program to practically
nil in the latter stages of this phase, due to the
gradual decrease in the supply of detailed
information on known enemy localities, and also
due to the fact that the rapid movement of
regiments would not permit as great a weight of
artillery to be used.
28. As the battle moved more rapidly, 24 Fd Regt
(SP) RA was placed under command 21 Tank
Brigade. 5 Cdn Med Regt from 1 Cdn AGRA and
an Assistant Counter Battery Staff from 1 Cdn
Corps were placed under my command. Thus I
was afforded the support of a counter battery
staff and a med regt should CBO and AGRA drop
too far behind. The tank brigade was afforded
the support of a field regiment should divisional
control of fire prove impracticable.
29. The breaching of the GOTHIC LINE and the
advance to the R CONCA had been achieved with
greater ease than anticipated. Phase III in all
respects had been a complete success.

Phase IV
The Advance to t h e R MARANO
30. To conform with the original plan of the
operation, 1 Cdn Inf Div was to attack on the
right sector of the Corps front along the axis
Highway 16 and capture RIMINI (8597). The first
stage of this attack was to be the establishment
of a bridgehead over the R CONCA and to
continue the advance to the R MARANO and then
to continue along the coastal axis. This plan was
to be executed initially by the gaining of the
bridgehead by the Royal Canadian Dragoons,
later to be taken over by the Royal Canadian
Regiment. Then the remainder of 1 Cdn Inf Bde
were to pass through and continue the advance
to the R MARANO.
31. The terrain over which this advance was to
take place, on initial study, might appear to be

far less difficult to traverse than that over which
we had just passed. On closer examination
however it was found to be tactically far more
difficult t h a n any g r o u n d previously
encountered. Ahead, and within the divisional
boundary, was the rolling ground across the R
CONCA for approximately 5000 yards following
which it gently sloped to the R MARANO - a
distance of approximately another 5000 yards.
The latter was entirely barren and completely
under observation from both the SAN LORENZO
- SAN MARTINO feature on the opposite side of
the R MARANO. and the SAN FORTUNATO
feature which entirely commanded observation
of the entire divisional front. These two features
were separated by still another river - the R
AUSA. The axis although not rugged was most
difficult.
32. The high and rugged hills on the left to which
our flanking Corps (5 Corps) had been unable
to penetrate, afforded complete observation of
our front at all times. It was apparent, before
this phase had been long under way, that the
completion of our task would be most difficult
unless 5 Corps attacked first and secured the
high ground on their front.
33. In this respect it was found necessary to
reorganize the plan for both 5 British Corps and
1 Cdn Corps. The plan was revised to include
another phase for 1 Cdn Corps, plus a containing
action to be included in this phase. While 5
Corps advanced on our left considerable
regrouping of our forces was carried out.
34. On the night of 2/3 September 1944 the Royal
Canadian Dragoons had pushed .across the R
CONCA forming a bridgehead into which
followed the Royal Canadian Regiment and later
the remainder of 1 Cdn Inf Bde. The brigade
advanced out of the bridgehead towards the R
MARANO against very heavy opposition. The
advance continued on the left to higher ground
on this side of the river, but on the right was
stopped before SAN LORENZO (904913) was
r e a c h e d . The Royal C a n a d i a n Dragoons
continued along the coast as far as RICCIONE
(923904). Progress was slow and no outstanding
advances were made. 3 Cdn Inf Bde was moved
across the R CONCA in rear of 1 Cdn Inf Bde on
9 September 1944 and thence advanced westerly
approximately two to three thousand yards. At
this point the division consolidated on a line
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"Auster III, Air Observation Post, Advanced Landing Ground" by Lawren P. Harris
Near Ceprano, on a field formerly used as a German anti-aircraft site, Auster III planes of "A" Flight, 657 Air
Observation Squadron, RAF during operations in support of First Canadian Corps.

904912-893902 preparatory to continuation of
the operation as outlined in the revised Corps
plan.
35. The entire resources of the divisional artillery
were placed at the disposal of 1 Cdn Inf Bde for
this advance. Although on different occasions
impromptu fire plans were conducted, both from
brigade and division, nothing of a set piece
nature was produced. In general the support
afforded flexibility; and centralization of control
where it could best be controlled was my aim.
36. The Air Observation Post at this time, and
from this time, became more valuable with each
succeeding day. Primarily it was a source of
information and secondly it proved almost the
only means by which observed shooting could
be carried out. The g r o u n d afforded no
observation that could in any way approach that
made possible by the Air Observation Post. In
addition to these normal roles however a
diversion was supplied to these flying gunners.

The navy provided destroyers and AGRA
provided 7.2-inch g u n s with which they
conducted many observed destructive shoots.
Truly in this and the succeeding phase of the
operations the Air Observation Post became the
"eyes of the Artillery."
37. The positions which the enemy had chosen
to defend proved almost entirely to be strongly
constructed Italian houses. Field and medium
concentrations proved of little value in silencing
or destroying these positions. The heavy FOOs
together with the Air Observation Post were
despatched to deal with them. A systematic
program of destruction was commenced. The
village of SAN LORENZO in STRADA (904913)
was almost completely reduced to rubble.
38. From the continuous artillery intelligence
data collated at my headquarters, as described
in para 24., a heavy harassing program was
maintained throughout this phase. A few
different types of fire were also employed:77
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(a) The dummy fire plan, ten minutes in
length on targets chosen by ourselves, but
with a co-ordinated timing throughout the
two Corps front.
(b) The map square type of HF, consisting of
one round on selected targets, in all map
squares possible, every seven minutes.
Included also as HF might be the Counter Battery
programmes which were continuous throughout
this period and of which more detailed account
will be provided by RCA 1 Cdn Corps.
39. The enemy, during this phase, produced his
most effective Counter Battery weapon - lurking
night bombers. The gun areas were bombed and
strafed on five different n i g h t s . S t r o n g
representations were submitted in order that our
LAA Regt be permitted to fire on the occasions
of their visits. Permission was finally granted but
only when our own night fighters were not
affording protection. On occasions when firing
was p e r m i t t e d , from a point of view of
destruction, the guns were of little value, but
from a point of view of harassing fire they did
force the enemy to approach from higher levels
and bomb less accurately. Morally they were of
the highest value both to the LAA gunner who
was firing his guns, and to the field gunner who
was being protected.
40. The division was now regrouped and poised
to go on. The divisional artillery was bolstered
by the addition of one regiment of Greek artillery
and three field plus one LAA Regt from 2 New
Zealand (NZ) Armd Div which came under
command 1 Cdn Inf Div 11 September 1944.
Regiments as necessary had been moved
forward. We were ready to support the next
phase.

Phase V
The Crossing of t h e R MARANO
The Battles for SAN LORENZO and
SAN FORTUNATO Features
The Capture of RIMINI
41. The stage was set and now the final phase to
capture RIMINI was about to commence.
42. On 12 September 1944 the two corps
offensive was launched starting with 5 Brit Corps

on the left supported by our three regiments of
NZ Arty. On 13 September all 1 Cdn Div Arty
groups supported the attack of 5 Cdn Armd Div
on t h e ridge n o r t h of CORIANO (8787)
subsequent to clearing the town proper.
43. At 1430 hours 14 Sep, 3 Cdn Inf Bde, with
12 Royal Tank Regt, started the divisional
advance up the left side of the divisional sector.
On the right 3 Greek Mountain Bde continued
the exertion of pressure along the coast in the
direction of RIMINI Airfield, and RIMINI. The 3
Cdn Inf Bde attack was put in across the R
MARANO against the feature SAN LORENZO
(862918) - SAN MARTINO (861935). By 1600
hours on 15 September, all but the right edge of
this feature was in our hands. In the meantime
1 Cdn Inf Bde, less one battalion placed under
command 3 Cdn Inf Bde, had crossed the R
MARANO behind 3 Cdn Inf Bde and were coming
up on their right in a flanking movement to cut
Highway 16 above the RIMINI Airfield (8893).
The leading battalion of 1 Cdn Inf Bde was
ordered to assist in the battle for SAN MARTINO.
Opposition on this right sector had stiffened. 3
Greek Mountain Bde in the meantime had
started to advance and by the evening of 15
September the R MARANO had been cleared.
Their advance then continued to the area
immediately west of the airfield. 2 Cdn Inf Bde
was brought forward then to assist in clearing
this feature and thence to push through 3 Cdn
Inf Bde bridgehead across R AUSA for the attack
on the SAN FORTUNATO (8294) feature. This
attack was carried out by both 2 and 3 Cdn Inf
Bdes and by afternoon of 20 September this
feature was in our hands. The following two days,
prior to the control of our sector passing to 2
NZ Div was spent in routine mopping up, and
e s t a b l i s h i n g a b r i d g e h e a d a c r o s s the R
MARECCHIA.
44. The artillery support for this phase divided
itself into stages to coincide with those of the
infantry attacks:(a) Support, by a detailed fire plan, of the
attack on the SAN LORENZO feature.
(b) A detailed fire plan on call for the 1 Cdn
Inf Bde right hook.
(c) A fully planned and co-ordinated fire plan
for the assault of the SAN FORTUNATO
feature.
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Night artillery shoot

(d) A smaller fire plan on call for the
exploitation a n d c r o s s i n g of t h e R
MARECCHIA.
These were the anticipated requirements of the
set piece fire plans for supporting the capture
of RIMINI. However they do not include the
n u m e r o u s impromptu fire plans fired for
b a t t a l i o n s or bdes, and which were not
previously anticipated.
45. The set piece fire plans utilized to the fullest
the great weight of artillery in support of 1 Cdn
Corps. A very high percentage of the 1301
rounds per gun expenditure of the divisional
artillery for this period, was fired on these set
piece programs. These plans, except in the case
of (c) above, consisted of very carefully chosen
concentrations and linear targets, so arranged
in belts that portions could be stopped, paused,
brought back or refired on call. It was always
intended that the infantry be afforded the
opportunity of being able to have the fire when
they desired it and where they desired it. In this
regard however very careful control was
necessary at my headquarters. This control was
maintained throughout and requests for fire
were answered by the greatest weight of guns
available in the shortest time possible.

46. The fire plan mentioned in para (c) above,
differed however, in that it consisted of a series
of linear targets in lanes, with one lane
supporting each attacking battalion. These linear
targets lifted in groups, as in a barrage, so that
the infantry during their advance were able to
control each lift as required, t h u s always
maintaining a wall of fire in front of them. This
fire plan was originally to have lasted two hours.
Actually it was fired, stopped, brought back,
paused and repeated during a period of almost
six hours, as that was the time required for the
infantry to secure their objectives.
47. Impromptu fire plans were far too numerous
to record. They were fired to assist the infantry
to start lines for set piece attacks. They were
fired on o u t s t a n d i n g points of resistance
requiring added effort. They were fired once the
objective had been attained and regrouping was
necessary. These short term, short notice fire
plans were a very important feature of the
artillery support of this phase, and required at
all times a detailed knowledge of the ever
changing enemy situation. This was maintained
as outlined previously.
48. Almost at all times, During the daylight
throughout this period smoke was used to
79
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50. On 20 September NZ Arty passed from
screen the movement of Canadian
our infantry
and the
under command to in Support of 1 Cdn Inf Div.
infantry of our flanking formations. These were
The PPCLI worked their way down to and over
generally predicted smoke screens usually
the R MARECCHIA. 3 Greek Mountain Bde
employing a regiment at a time. Observation and
entered and captured RIMINI. On 21 September
a d j u s t m e n t were carried out by the Air
the bridgehead was complete and 2 NZ Div
Observation Post and results were excellent.
commenced the take-over from 1 Cdn Inf Div.
Both coloured smoke and smoke lines were fired
This was completed by the 22 September.
by our artillery as bombing aids in the concerted
bomber efforts throughout this phase. Smoke
51. RIMINI had been taken and the operation
was recognized once again to be a definite and
was completed.
valuable form of artillery support.

49. Movement for this battle was confined to one
move forward to facilitate support for the attacks
on SAN FORTUNATO feature and one further
move to facilitate support of the exploitation to
the R MARECCHIA. Movement was not a
problem but good gun areas were. The areas for
all the regiments could at best be termed fair.
Flash cover and protection for gun areas was
not available and until the final feature was
taken, it was almost impossible to escape
observation by the enemy.

NOTE: Prevalent throughout this operation was
an item which could not be isolated to any
particular phase, the offensive utilization of antitank guns. 6-pounders, 17-pounders and M-10s
were all used extensively in this role. They were
brought well forward to destroy houses and
fortifications as well as enemy tanks. Most antitank guns fired more high explosive (HE) than
armour-piercing (AP) ammunition. They greatly
assisted as close support weapons, the infantry
or tanks whom they were supporting. No doubt
similar occasions
will a r i s e in t h e
future when once
again their role will
be offensive rather
than defensive.

Staff from 3rd Canadian
Infantry Brigade plan
operations in Italy.
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